

# Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating The Access Problem(s)

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## Abstract

In this paper I discuss a trivialization worry for currently popular formulations of the ‘access problem’ in philosophy of mathematics. I argue that we can avoid this worry by relating access worries to general epistemic norms of coincidence avoidance. Specifically, I propose that a realist theory of some domain of investigation (such as mathematics or morals) *faces an access problem* to the extent that accepting this theory commits one to positing *any* extra unexplained coincidence beyond those required by competing deflationary approaches to the same domain. I then use this formulation of the access problem to diagnose what goes wrong in Justin Clarke-Doane’s recent argument that there can be no access problem.

## 1 Introduction

In ‘Mathematical Truth’ [2], Benacerraf presents a classic worry for realists about mathematical objects – what is sometimes called the access problem. He argues from a causal constraint on knowledge to the conclusion that if realism were true, human knowledge of mathematics would be impossible. Many philosophers have been deeply moved by *something about* this worry (and analogous concerns in related domains), even while rejecting the specific premises employed in Benacerraf’s argument [5] [15]. However, a satisfactory formulation of this access worry has proved elusive.

In the first half of this paper, I develop Hartry Field’s idea that we should understand access worries in terms of realists’ commitment to a match between human beliefs and realist facts which cries out for explanation and (apparent)

inability to give a suitable explanation. I argue that existing elaborations of this core idea (by Field and others) go astray by fixing on a single explanandum R, and identifying access worries with inability to explain R from more general premises which the realist believes suffices.

Instead, I propose, Fieldian access worries are better understood as motivated by a general norm of *ceteris paribus* coincidence reduction. Specifically, a realist theory of some domain of investigation (such as mathematics or morals) faces an access problem to the extent that accepting this theory (appears to) commit one to positing any ‘extra’ coincidences (beyond those required by competing approaches to the same domain).

Accordingly, we shouldn’t expect to find a *single* reliability claim, such that merely explaining it suffices to banish access worries. And it is easy to see what goes wrong with certain contentious responses to earlier formulations of the access problem [?][?], which explain away one apparent extra coincidence involving human accuracy, which the realist seems committed to positing, by appealing to another.

In the second half of this paper, I use this understanding of access worries to resist Justin Clarke-Doane’s argument that there can be no access problem regarding mathematics and morals[4]. I also note that one can read Clarke-Doane as suggesting that there is no access problem because (either) our coincidence-avoidance intuitions about which correlations involving necessary truths ‘cry out for explanation’ are deeply unreliable, or all such cries for explanation can be answered by just by ‘stapling together’ two unrelated explanations for each half of the coincidence. But this suggestion is deeply implausible, because (as I will show) accepting either alternative would require junking an important and apparently fruitful part of current mathematical practice.

## 2 Field's Formulation of the Access Problem and Trivialization Worries

### 2.1 Field's Formulation of the Access Problem

Let me begin by reviewing Hartry Field's approach to the access problem, and the trivialization worries which have arisen for it.

In *Realism, Mathematics and Modality*[6], Field suggests that we should think of the access problem for mathematical realists as arising from a challenge for the realist to, "explain how our beliefs about [mathematical objects] can so well reflect the facts about them" in some internally coherent fashion. He notes that, "[I]f it appears in principle impossible to explain this [match between our beliefs and reality], then that tends to undermine ... belief in mathematical entities, despite whatever reason we might have for believing in them." I will develop and defend this core proposal in what follows.

However, Field elaborates this core idea in a way which (I will suggest) raises concerns about triviality. He argues that we can only attribute mathematicians knowledge of a mathematical claim  $\phi$  if the following reliability claim holds. (I will discuss different ways of understanding this reliability claim below).

**R:** Reliably, if mathematicians accept that ' $\phi$ ', then  $\phi$ .

Admittedly, a thinker could have significant *true mathematical beliefs* without this kind of reliability, but Field suggests that such a person would not qualify as having knowledge. For example, a 'lucky fool', who decides whether or not to believe mathematical statements on the basis of a coin toss and winds up with many true beliefs in this way, would (plausibly) not count as knowing these mathematical statements.

Thus, because the mathematical realist believes we have significant mathematical knowledge, she is plausibly committed to accepting the above reliability

claim. But, Field suggests, it appears in principle impossible for the realist to give any satisfactory explanation for  $R$ . And this fact casts doubt on the truth of realism.

The resulting view has obvious appeal. It has been used (with some minor modifications) to articulate access worries concerning other domains like morals and metaphysical possibility<sup>1</sup>. Unlike Benacerraf's original access worry, Field's formulation does not depend on any contentious assumptions about causal constraints on knowledge. Furthermore, Field's formulation appears to reveal an internal tension within the realist's beliefs. It thereby vindicates the common intuition that access worries are different from (and more troubling than) mere skepticism<sup>2</sup>.

I think Field is quite right that the mathematical realist faces strong epistemic pressure to explain  $R$ , and that dispelling the impression that they can't do so is a necessary condition for dissolving access worries. However, we will see that explaining  $R$  is plausibly not *sufficient* to answer access worries. So, although Field's core approach is right and his further argument highlights crucial issues, it would be a mistake to take the final step of identifying access worries with inability to explain  $R$ .

## 2.2 Safety and the Trivialization Problem

To see why explaining  $R$  is (plausibly) insufficient to answer access worries, let's consider a few different ways of cashing out the reliability claim made by  $R$ .

One popular approach is to read  $R$  as demanding that our mathematical

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<sup>1</sup>Just as it seems mysterious that our mathematical intuitions match objective facts about (say) platonic mathematical objects or proof transcendent coherence facts, it can seem mysterious that our a priori intuitions about goodness, beauty or what causally isolated Lewisian possible worlds exist match objectives facts.

<sup>2</sup>It's not just that the access worrier can't justify their mathematical beliefs from indubitable premises which the skeptic accepts, but that their account of human accuracy seems troubling from their own point of view.

beliefs be ‘safe’ in the sense that<sup>3</sup> they could not have easily been wrong, i.e., mathematicians’ belief forming methods would not have lead them to form false beliefs at any suitably close possible worlds.

Another possibility, which Field mentions as a fall-back option, is to drop counterfactual considerations and simply say that the *actual* abundance of true mathematical beliefs and lack of false mathematical beliefs is something which the realist owes us an explanation for.

But if one takes either of these approaches, then (as Øystein Linnebo[15] and Justin Clarke-Doane[4] have separately noted) it seems like one can ‘trivially’ explain the relevant form of reliability/accuracy, using other premises which the realist accepts, as follows.

TRIV: Mathematicians reliably believe truths because they reliably believe only those mathematical claims which can be proved in a certain formal system  $\Sigma$  (something like first order reasoning from the axioms of ZFC), and this formal system is (necessarily) truth preserving.

TRIV seems to explain the safety of our mathematical beliefs. For, as it’s robustly the case that mathematicians form their mathematical beliefs by making inferences authorized by  $\Sigma$ , they will continue to form mathematical beliefs via  $\Sigma$  in all relevantly close possible worlds. And the sentences derivable via  $\Sigma$  are all necessary truths. Hence all these close possible worlds will be ones in which they continue to form mostly true mathematical beliefs, thereby explaining the safety of our mathematical beliefs (as the realist understands them). And TRIV also seems to explain (at least in some sense) our possession of many true and few false mathematical beliefs (in the actual world), by pointing out that we arrive at mathematical beliefs by reasoning validly from true axioms.

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<sup>3</sup>See Field’s student Clarke-Doane’s development of reliability in [3] and [4]

However, it is equally clear that citing TRIV does nothing to satisfy intuitive access worries. This suggests that intuitive access worries cannot be reduced to the need to explain either the safety of our mathematical beliefs or the fact that we have many true and few false mathematical beliefs.

Now Field could, obviously, respond to this objection by denying that TRIV constitutes a genuine explanation for R (or for our possession of many true and few false mathematical beliefs) [6]. And this idea has some *prima facie* attraction<sup>4</sup>. But many readers (like Linnebo and Clarke-Doane) seem to have the opposite intuition. And I think it is ultimately hard to deny that TRIV provides *some kind* of an explanation of R.

For we can easily imagine non-philosophical contexts where TRIV would constitute an excellent response to an explanatory demand: an anthropologist could explain why some newly-discovered community is reliable about mathematics/had so many true and so few false mathematical beliefs by showing that all their mathematical reasoning can be reconstructed in terms of some formal system and then noting that this system is sound<sup>5</sup>. So, in the absence of further sharpening of the intuitive notion of explanation (something Field doesn't provide), it appears that TRIV does explain R and access worries cannot be reduced to the need to explain R.

Note, also, that one cannot defend Field's account of the access problem by rejecting TRIV merely on the grounds that it assumes the theorems of  $\Sigma$  are true in a realist sense (e.g., correctly describe the platonic objects) which

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<sup>4</sup>One might buttress this position by appealing to [?]'s intuition that, "It seems to me obvious that.... to explain the relational fact, it is not enough to show separately why each of the relata had to be what it was. We want a reason for the relationship itself, the fact that the notes matched." and saying that TRIV doesn't give a reason for the relationship (between human belief and objective realist mathematical facts) asserted by R. However, the anthropological example below suggests that TRIV does explain the relationship in a sense (just one that's deeply unsatisfying in the context of access worries). Also, as Lando acknowledges, the above intuition is deeply controversial (though I'm personally sympathetic).

<sup>5</sup>Such explanation would admittedly be partial, but that doesn't prevent it from being an explanation. As David Lewis notes everything we give is a partial explanation: the accident occurred because of the bald tire, because of the driver's slipshod maintenance etc[13].

philosophers pressing an access worry wouldn't accept. For, this doesn't prevent TRIV from being an internally coherent explanation from the realist's perspective of our accuracy about mathematics. One of the great benefits of Field's proposal was that it appeared to reveal an *internal* problem for realism, not just a skeptical worry. Thus, it suffices for the realist to give an internally coherent explanation.

### 2.3 Interpreting R More Demandingly

One natural thought is to interpret the 'reliability' invoked in Field's R more demandingly, and use this as a basis for rejecting TRIV.

Suppose we grant that TRIV explains why there aren't any *extremely close* possible words at which mathematicians' beliefs are massively false. If we read Field's reliability claim R more demandingly – as requiring mathematicians to be accurate in a larger sphere of close possible words *including some where they don't form beliefs via  $\Sigma$*  – then we can still resist the claim that TRIV explains R<sup>6</sup>.

It's not immediately obvious that the realist is committed to the truth of such a demanding version of R. Rigorously defending this approach would require arguing that the realist is committed to some specific and much higher degree of reliability, and I haven't seen anyone do this<sup>7</sup>.

But I won't dwell on this hurdle, as I think a deeper problem is lurking. The problem is that we can imagine discoveries which would imply and (in a sense) explain *even very modally robust* agreement between human psychology and realist facts about something like math or morals, while still leaving intuitive access worries untouched. Thus, a more demanding interpretation of R is incapable of rescuing Field's elaboration of his core intuitions.

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<sup>6</sup>This corresponds to individuating our methods more broadly

<sup>7</sup>This is a version of the famous 'generality problem' for reliabilist epistemologies [7].

For example, consider the classic moral realist, who takes our beliefs about permissible favoritism toward relatives to be ‘robustly objectively correct’ in a sense which implies that creatures apparently inclined to advocate and practice a different degree of favoritism would have false beliefs about morality (rather than true beliefs about some equally good other notion of equal metaphysical status). Moral realists of this stripe intuitively face an access worry about the accuracy of our moral beliefs<sup>8</sup>. Now imagine such a moral realist attempting to address access worries by giving the following kind of (obviously cartoonish) explanation of our accuracy about permissible favoritism facts .

EV-MOR: It is a robust fact that, in all circumstances conducive to the evolution of intelligence, natural selection favors the trait of advocating and valuing being twice as generous with immediate family as with other individuals. Furthermore, it is morally correct to be (exactly) twice as generous with family, and this is a necessary truth.

This story certainly seems to provide some kind of explanation for our accuracy about moral facts in a very wide range of possible worlds. Yet, this explanation does nothing to answer intuitive access worries<sup>9</sup>. This is not just because the genealogy of morals suggested above is probably false. For even if imagine that that the evolutionary/game theory part of EV-MOR were unquestionably true and getting at a deeply reliable law of nature, considering EV-MOR would still do nothing to address intuitive access worries. Thus, Field’s diagnosis of the access problem can’t be rescued by increasing the level of reliability required.

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<sup>8</sup>Note that even imperfect moral accuracy (at a rate substantially better than chance) can give rise to such an access worry.

<sup>9</sup>A similarly unsatisfying example explanation can be developed in the case of mathematics. EV-MATH The only way for intelligence to evolve involves having a compositional language, and the only way that mathematics-like practices ever arise if from some fluke reusing the brain structures which compute grammaticality to produce assertions about certain mathematical structures, and it just so happens that these correspond to the platonic mathematical objects which actually exist.

## 2.4 Sensitivity and Counter-Possible Conditionals

A different strategy for understanding the reliability claim in Field's R is to appeal to metaphysically impossible worlds.

Employing metaphysically impossible worlds has little effect on safety<sup>10</sup>. However, it does give teeth to sensitivity requirements (another popular way of thinking about reliability). Sensitivity demands that if  $\phi$  hadn't been true we wouldn't have believed  $\phi$  (i.e., in the closest possible worlds where  $P$  isn't true we don't believe  $P$ ). Our mathematical beliefs are trivially sensitive if we interpret this requirement using regular Lewisian counterfactuals (because there are no possible worlds where they are false).

However, demanding that realists explain sensitivity at metaphysically impossible worlds promises to let us reject explanations like TRIV and EV-MOR. For the fact that mathematicians reliably tend to accept propositions derivable from certain necessarily true axioms doesn't appear to explain why, in metaphysically impossible worlds where these axioms are false, we would still wind up having true mathematical beliefs. Indeed, such explanations seem to suggest that if mathematics/morals had been different then our beliefs would have been just the same (because these beliefs are shaped by unrelated evolutionary/game theoretic/anatomical considerations).

However, this approach actually faces very serious problems. First, there are reasons for doubting that we have any coherent shared grip on the closeness relation for metaphysically impossible scenarios (aka 'counterpossible conditionals'). For example, if  $2 + 2 = 5$  would  $+$  still satisfy the usual inductive definition? If not, how would things be different? Despite advances in understanding the

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<sup>10</sup>As Justin Clarke-Doane points out, even if we allow that 'impossible worlds' where mathematical facts are different can in principle be relevant to truth conditions for counterfactuals, it would seem that these worlds would be very remote from the actual one – so it's not clear why explaining reliability should require showing that mathematicians' beliefs would continue to express truths in these very remote possible worlds[4].

logic of counterpossible conditionals [16], we still face significant uncertainty (or perhaps conceptual underdetermination) concerning the substantive closeness relation on impossible worlds<sup>11</sup>. Given this uncertainty, cashing out informal access worries in terms of a demand to explain counterpossible conditionals doesn't seem very helpful.

A second problem for this approach is that the counter-possible sensitivity requirement seems to fail (or is at least hard to explain) in many cases which are intuitively unproblematic. For example, if bachelors were unmarried women rather than unmarried men, would we still believe that bachelors are unmarried men<sup>12</sup>? Presumably there is no reason to doubt our knowledge of bachelorhood facts and this calls into question this interpretation of the sensitivity requirement above.

### 3 Linnebo and Alternative Languages

Now let us turn to Øysten Linnebo's attempt to fix Field's criterion. As noted above, Linnebo presses a version of the trivialization problem against Field. So one might hope that his version of the access problem would avoid trivialization worries. However, I will argue that it does not.

Linnebo accepts Field's supposition that access worries arise from the realist's inability to explain some particular fact. But he replaces Field's explanandum with a different reliability claim:

$R_{MS}$  If mathematical sentences (like " $2 + 2 = 4$ ") had not expressed truths then mathematicians wouldn't have accepted them.

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<sup>11</sup>Or the substantive closeness relation which would be relevant to this attempt to formulate access worries, if there is some kind of context dependence as David Lewis has suggested [14].

<sup>12</sup>Justin Clarke-Doane gives a somewhat more complicated example along these lines in [4]: if the facts about what configurations of matter constituted a chair were different, would our beliefs be different?

In terms of possible worlds,  $R_{MS}$  asserts that, the closest possible worlds in which linguistic differences mean that the symbols/sounds “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ” express a falsehood are ones in which mathematicians no longer accept this *sentence*<sup>13</sup>. Thus, one can think of Linnebo as using counterfactuals about semantic facts instead of *metaphysically impossible worlds* to spell out the sensitivity requirement from the prior section.

However, Linnebo’s story faces its own trivialization problem, as well as an over-demandingness problem. To see this trivialization problem, note that it might easily be that the closest possible worlds where a mathematical sentence like “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ” doesn’t express a truth are ones where some superficial and recent change in language/orthography went differently, e.g., worlds where the transition from Roman numerals to Arabic numerals went differently so that the symbol “2” is now used to mean 3. These will indeed be worlds where people no longer accept “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ” (since these are worlds in which the translation from Roman numerals went differently<sup>14</sup>). So it seems like we can explain Linnebo’s  $R_{MS}$  by appealing to the possibility of orthographic change and our inclination to deny false mathematical claims.

More generally, Linnebo’s  $R_{MS}$  conditionals seems to be potentially explicable via all the unsatisfying explanations for human accuracy about mathematical/moral facts discussed in the previous section. For instance EV-MOR asserted that evolution and game theory determine that intelligent creatures are overwhelmingly likely to treat a certain amount of favoritism as permissible, and that ratio of permissible favoritism also happens to be objectively correct. Assuming EV-MOR is true, the closest worlds where, “helping friends twice as much as strangers is permissible” expresses a falsehood would be ones where we don’t accept this sentence (so Linnebo’s metasemantic version of the

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<sup>13</sup>So, for example, mathematicians in this world don’t assent to this sentence in conversation or place it into textbooks.

<sup>14</sup>Thanks to ██████████, in conversation, for the example involving Roman numerals.

sensitivity requirement is satisfied). At least, this explanation seems sufficient assuming that “permissible” continues to express a similar concept at close possible worlds. Thus, EV-MOR plausibly explains  $R_{MS}$  (as well as Field’s  $R$ ) without answering access worries.

This caveat raises the issue of what kind of grip we have on these linguistic counterfactuals at all. For example, if ‘there are dogs’ had expressed a falsehood, what claim would it have expressed? Would it still have expressed a true claim? There are many different scenarios where some sequence of symbols like “ $2+2=4$ ” fails to express a truth and it’s not at all clear that the closest such worlds are ones in which “ $2+2=4$ ” even has anything to do with mathematics. This brings us to a second problem for Linnebo.

The problem is that we can construct cases where some quirk of history ensures the falsehood of the counterfactual  $R_{MS}$  in a way that does nothing to generate an intuitive access worry or any kind of problem with positing knowledge. For example, it’s been argued that medieval science often expected deep analogies between different domains, so that very different things (personality types, metals, planets, mythical Greek gods) that somehow participated in the nature of Neptune would behave analogously. Imagine a possible world where analogous theories were developed for astrology and fledgling chemistry (and each had a special notation), so that there was a fairly simple correspondence between sentences expressing (supposed) truths of the astrological theory and those expressing (supposed) truths of the chemical theory in the year 800 CE. Now suppose that, because of these analogies, some monastic copying error swapped the symbols used to express chemical reactions and astrological claims so that “ $\text{H}^+ + \text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{H}_2\text{O}$ ” went from originally expressing an astrological claim (say, the proposition that male Leos and female Libras are romantically linked when Mars is entering Scorpio) to expressing the claim that it expresses

in normal English. And suppose that chemistry and astrology developed separately in the years after 800, with both continuing to enjoy great popularity. We can imagine a chemist who has (intuitively) justified beliefs about chemistry, and unjustified beliefs about astrology. Plausibly, some of the closest possible worlds to this one where “ $\text{H}^+ + \text{OH}^- \rightleftharpoons \text{H}_2\text{O}$ ” fails to express a truth would be ones where this copying error never happened (rather than the very remote ones in which the chemical reactions proceed differently). In such worlds, the above sentence will express a widespread and a long standing, but false, doctrine about astronomy, which our horoscope-reading chemist also accepts. Thus it won’t be the case that, had various chemical sentences not expressed a truth, she wouldn’t have believed them. Yet intuitively our chemist could qualify as having chemical propositions actually expressed by these sentences. Thus we seem to have a counterexample to  $R_{MS}$ <sup>15</sup>.

This final problem is only heightened if we try to avoid trivializing explanations (like the roman numerals example discussed above) by strengthening our reliability requirements. For doing this only increases the risk of demanding too much, i.e., that Linnebo’s conditional  $R_{MS}$  could fail for reasons (like the chancy chemical-astrological symbol swap) that do nothing to impugn our claims to knowledge of a given domain. Thus, there’s no plausible interpretation of Linnebo’s  $R_{MS}$  which lets us avoid both trivialization worries and appeal to a sensitivity principle which we have independent reason for doubting.

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<sup>15</sup>As unlikely events do happen, we can’t rely on the fact that in the *actual world* there wasn’t some very implausible copying error which miraculously swapped the chemical and astrological symbols (with the unlikely result that chemical assertions became understandable astrological assertions and vice-versa). If Linnebo’s diagnosis is correct then, in such a case, we should face an access problem in chemistry as worlds that didn’t undergo such a swap would be very close. However, deriving chemical knowledge from careful experiment isn’t epistemically assailable just because an unlikely event was responsible for how we write down this knowledge.

## 4 A Coincidence Avoidance Approach to Access Worries

### 4.1 Field's Core Idea and General Norms of Coincidence Avoidance

In view of the problems for spelling out (or replacing) Field's explanandum R discussed above, I propose that we develop Field's core intuition in a different way, which does not commit us to there being a single reliability fact, such that merely explaining this fact (from more general premises which the realist believes) would suffice to answer access worries. The key idea will be to relate Field's intuitive access worry to general norms of coincidence avoidance.

Specifically, I propose that a realist theory of some domain of investigation (such as mathematics or morals) faces an access problem to the extent that accepting it commits one to positing a certain kind of coincidental match between human beliefs and the facts about that domain, but prevents one from giving any explanation which would remove this appearance of coincidence. A little more formally, a realist theory faces an access problem to the extent that:

Combining this theory with uncontroversial claims about the extent of human accuracy about the domain in question forces us to posit *some* coincidental match between human beliefs and belief-independent facts which intuitively 'cries out for explanation.' However, no satisfactory explanation of this match is possible.

When this holds, it would seem that we have a significant (if defeasable) reason to reject the realist theory in question. Such theories are *ceteris paribus* undesirable, in that they commit us to positing an extra inexplicable coincidence: a match between human psychology and the realist's subject matter

which cries out for explanation but cannot be explained.

Note that this constitutes an internal problem for the relevant theory. For the shared norms of coincidence avoidance which we draw on in phrasing access worries are *themselves* part of the realist's total picture of reality. Thus, (we can continue to say that) the realist faces an internal tension – in this case, a tension between their philosophical beliefs about some domain and their own sense of which kinds of correlations constitute an unattractive coincidence.

Also note that, on the view I'm advocating, access worries only give us *ceteris paribus* reason to reject a given realist theory of some domain. If it turns out that all the alternative views which avoid this access problem have worse flaws (as, e.g., formalist theories which have trouble capturing proof transcendent truth conditions and the role of math in the sciences plausibly do), this bullet might be worth biting.

While, strictly speaking, a theory has an access problem to the extent no satisfactory explanation of the match between beliefs and belief-independent facts is possible, I will sometimes speak loosely and say that a theory faces an access problem when it *appears* that no such explanation is possible (though, to be pedantic, it only apparently faces an access problem). When it no longer appears that no such satisfactory explanation is possible, I will say that the access problem has been solved or dissolved. Thus, classical attempts to eliminate access worries like Modal-Structuralism, Quantifier Variance, Quineinism and Neo-Fregean view can be seen as attempts to solve (or partially solve) the access problem as conceptualized above<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup>Modal-Structuralism, Quantifier Variance, and Neo-Fregeanism help answer access worries (as characterized above) by suggesting that any logically coherent mathematical posits would express truths and thus explaining how any coherent mathematical beliefs we have correspond to mathematical truths (of course the issue of how we come to have coherent mathematical beliefs remains).

## 4.2 Helpful Consequences

Recognizing access worries as an application of more general norms of coincidence avoidance has two interesting and helpful consequences.

First, my proposal identifies access worries with a holistic problem with the realist's account and thus explains why (as noted above) they can't be dismissed by explaining one type of accuracy in terms of another, equally problematic, type of accuracy.

For, to solve my version of the access problem, one has to remove the appearance of commitment to positing *any* extra coincidences. So we can allow that TRIV and EV-MOR do, in some sense, explain human possession of true beliefs but still maintain that they are useless in addressing access worries because each makes salient appeal to an extra coincidence, which more deflationary rival understandings of mathematical/moral practice let us avoid. Specifically, TRIV explains our accuracy about realist mathematical facts by appealing to an unexplained coincidental-seeming match between the mathematical reasoning method  $\Sigma$  and realist mathematical facts. And EV-MOR only explains our good intuitions about morality by appealing to an unexplained match between game theoretic optimality and objective moral facts.

Second, this approach suggests an important way in which access worries can be a matter of degree. While a philosophical theory either does or doesn't allow for an explanation of  $R$  or  $R_{MS}$  (and thus does or doesn't face an access problem), on this approach one theory can be preferred to another as it requires accepting fewer coincidences.

Because of this comparative element, we should *not* think of access worries as invoking an epistemic requirement to 'consign to the flames' every theory that posits a coincidence (analogous to Hume's famous empiricist exhortation to reject all concepts that weren't suitably related to experience[8]). Instead,

access worriers appeal to general norms in favor of *reducing* the number of coincidences one is committed to positing, insofar as this is compatible with other epistemic goals.

This is important and helpful because it means that, even if our knowledge of inductive generalization raises an access problem on its own right (maybe even an insoluble access problem), we can still invoke inductive generalization to dispel our access worries regarding a domain like mathematics (as no rival theory would dispel the coincidence that the future seems to behave like the past). Thus, in contrast to earlier accounts, my view allows theories to suffer access worries to varying degrees depending on the number and implausibility of the coincidences they are committed to positing.

### **4.3 Do We Owe a Further Analysis of Coincidence?**

This way of understanding access worries can seem to require using an unacceptably imprecise notion of coincidence avoidance. However, I want to point out that the same imprecise notion plays an important role in scientific and philosophical reasoning.

We clearly have a practice of distinguishing certain parts of a theory as unattractive coincidences. And we take commitment to any such extra coincidences to be a (*ceteris paribus*) reason to disfavor a theory. Think of the kind of argument we might use to convince someone to stop believing in the Loch Ness monster. We generally wouldn't be able to derive the non-existence of the monster from beliefs we share with the Loch Ness conspiracy theorist, or locate a literal contradiction within their beliefs. Rather, we would point out unattractive extra coincidences which the Loch Ness monster theory has to admit (the monster never shows up when someone has a really good camera, it only appears in pictures which could plausibly be faked etc.) but can't elegantly

explain. We appeal to a kind of shared general epistemic norm, which says that one has *ceteris paribus* reason to avoid theories which posit certain kinds of (inexplicable) coincidences. What results isn't a deduction that the Loch Ness monster doesn't exist, but rather, *ceteris paribus* reasons for disfavoring its existence.

Admittedly, what makes something a coincidence is rather complicated. Coincidences aren't just facts posited by a theory which would otherwise be assigned low probability given the rest of a theory. For example, any particular long sequence of outcomes of a coin toss is unlikely, but we don't take total theories of the world which include the results of past coin tosses to be committed to an extra unattractive coincidence<sup>17</sup>. Nonetheless, spotting and rejecting such coincidences plays an important role in scientific and commonsense reasoning<sup>18</sup>, even when we can't appeal to anything like a general Carnapian logic of induction. We might wish to have a tidy and uncontroversial criterion for when a theory counts as positing extra coincidences. However, we are all committed to using this kind of reasoning all the time, on a 'know it when you see it' basis. Thus, it seems reasonable to take these intuitions about theoretical badness at face value.

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#### 4.4 A note about tractability

A consequence of the appeal to shared implicit intuitions (about coincidences, adequate explanation, the possibility of giving various kinds of explanation etc) above that one can reasonably believe that coincidence-banishing explanation

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<sup>17</sup>The feeling of coincidence/crying out for explanation seems related to an intuition that some other theory predicting the same things but with fewer dimensions of freedom should exist, but the question of a priori theory plausibility is an infamously hard one and I won't speculate about this more here.

<sup>18</sup>For example the clustering of the orbits of many trans-Neptunian objects has lead astronomers to hypothesize the existence of a 9th planet orbiting beyond 200 AU [20].

for some regularity is impossible for the realist without being able to explicitly deduce the impossibility from specific features of the realist's account<sup>19</sup>. So pressing an access worry does not require being able to cite particular features (causal inertness, lack of role in scientific explanations) which prevent the realist from providing an adequate coincidence-banishing explanation<sup>20</sup>.

This might feel like it highlights (or perhaps even intensifies) a general weakness of Fieldian approaches to the access problem: they threaten to make debates about access worries deeply intractable, or perhaps even rhetorically 'stack the deck' in favor of anti-realism. One advantage of Benacerraf's original formulation of the access problem (as a deduction of the impossibility of realist mathematical knowledge from independently attractive general philosophical principles, like a causal theory of knowledge) is that it gives the realist material to work with and a natural strategy for responding/advancing debate: they can dispute the relevant general claims. In contrast, my proposal lets one formulate and press an access worry by appealing to a shared 'know it when you see it' grasp of what qualifies as an undue coincidence (and similar brute particular intuitions about what explanations are possible, given the realists' theoretical resources). So it lets access worriers attack without pointing to any specific features of the realist theory which (they claim) cause a problem, or providing

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<sup>19</sup>To motivate this point, consider our intuitions about Tangram puzzles (which challenge us to re-arrange various sized triangles to form a particular shape). There are two quite different epistemic states one can be while judging that a particular Tangram puzzle seems impossible to solve. In some cases, one can point to specific features of a specified problem which allow one prove from attractive general principles that it is not solvable. In other cases one merely has the gestalt impression (arising from experience with related problems and general spatial intuitions) that a certain problem is impossible to solve. It's hard to deny that the latter intuitions, though not justifying full confidence, can rationalize assigning higher confidence to certain possibilities and acting accordingly. For example, analogous intuitions about what kind of proof strategies can and cannot be successfully used in a given case would seem to play an important role in rationally guiding mathematicians activities when they attempt to find a proof.

<sup>20</sup>Thinking about access worries as being justified by a gestalt impression rather than a single salient feature of realist views is especially important insofar as previous discussion of access worries has often centered around a combination of features, e.g., non-analyticity and lack of scientific role which work together to jointly block various known strategies for explaining knowledge of a given domain from working in the mathematical/moral case. See Justin Clarke-Doane's [3].

any general theory about why these features are a problem, which the realist can respond by contesting.

In this way, adopting my proposal can seem to make disputes over the access problem deeply intractable – by letting access worriers issue their challenge from the unassailable swamp land of brute intuitions about what cries out for explanation and what explanations realists may be in principle able to provide. Happily however, I think such pessimism is unwarranted, as there are other credible ways in which debate about access worries can be carried out, and by which widespread philosophical agreement could plausibly be produced.

On one hand, realists can vanquish oppositions, by providing an suitable **sample explanation** for our accuracy about the relevant domain which can be intuitively to banish coincidences (or only employs coincidences which anti-realists about the relevant domain are independently committed to positing). For instance, consider the very rough story provided by Quinean empiricism about mathematics<sup>21</sup>. On the Quinean picture, we acquire largely true beliefs about mathematics in the course of acquiring accurate scientific beliefs as a whole – by adopting empirically motivated scientific theories which force us to quantify over suitable mathematical objects.

There are well known problems for this Quinean story<sup>22</sup>. But it illustrates the kind of approach that could alleviate access worries (as opposed to merely silencing them and inspiring worriers to find a new form to articulate their discomfort<sup>23</sup>). For (unlike the trivializing explanations EV-MOR and TRIV criticized above), Quine’s story appears to avoid appealing to any extra unattrac-

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<sup>21</sup>Here I will be discussing Quinean Empiricism where this is understood as a story about the actual history of how human beings got accurate beliefs about mathematics, rather than (as I take Quine to have intended it to be) a story about how our beliefs are justified.

<sup>22</sup>For example, we seem to get mathematics right in advance of scientific applications, and we seem to know about the existence of mathematical objects in areas such as higher set theory which may forever lack relevant scientific applications).

<sup>23</sup>Consider the way that standard objections to the Benacerraf’s original formulation of the access problem via rejection of his causal constraint on knowledge felt unsatisfying.

tive coincidences which the mathematical anti-realist can avoid positing<sup>24</sup>. If Quine’s story worked, it would explain accuracy about mathematics using only faculties which his anti-realist opponents have independent reason for accepting as reliable. Thus it has a hope of dispelling the access worries for (ontological) realism about mathematics, i.e., the appearance that accepting realism about mathematical objects commits one to positing *extra* coincidences (i.e., ones which could be avoided just by adopting a more deflationary philosophy of mathematics).

Conversely, I think there are also credible paths to philosophical agreement that there is a genuine access problem for realism about a given domain. For example, a history of massive effort and continued failure to discover any plausible explanation of a certain coincidence can itself gradually increase access worries on my account<sup>25</sup>. Thus, my account doesn’t leave us bereft of any way to repudiate access worries, while it also doesn’t obviously make such worries any less forceful. It provides a way for access worries to get worse and a way for them to get better.

## 5 Answering Clarke-Doane’s Challenge

With this explication of the access problem on the table, let us now turn to Justin Clarke-Doane’s argument in ‘What Is the Benacerraf Problem?’[4] that there can’t be an access problem for mathematics, morals (and other domains with similar features). As Clarke Doane puts it in [4]

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<sup>24</sup>Arguably Quine’s story does employ some unattractive and unexplained coincidences, by presuming that human faculties of doing scientific induction and inference to the best explanation are generally accurate. But note that even if this is so, it not a problem because, the coincidence that gets smuggled in is not an extra one. Mathematical anti-realists already have separate reason for accepting the accuracy of our ways of doing scientific induction, so this this coincidence is something they already have to swallow or find some way of explaining.

<sup>25</sup>I say this with the caveat that philosophical progress is often very slow, so (as noted in the previous section) it might take a long history of many failed attempts to create any significant confidence that this challenge cannot be answered.

“The difficulties surrounding the Benacerraf Problem are actually very general. They infect formulations of it aimed at moral realism, modal realism, logical realism, and philosophical realism. But they infect much more than this. They infect any argument which grants the (actual) truth and (defeasible) justification of our beliefs from an area and seeks to undermine those beliefs, so long as the area  $F$  meets two conditions. Those conditions are:

1. The  $F$ -truths would be metaphysically necessary.
2. There is a plausible explanation of our having the  $F$ -beliefs that we have which shows that we could not have easily had different ones.”

I take Clarke-Doane’s argument for this thesis to have essentially the following structure.

1. If there were a genuine access worry for realists (about some domain), it would undermine our justification for holding all beliefs of a certain kind  $K$ <sup>26</sup>.
2. “Modal Security: If information,  $E$ , undermines all of our beliefs of a kind,  $K$ , then it does so by giving us reason to doubt that our  $K$ -beliefs are both sensitive and safe.”[4]<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup>I take Clarke-Doane’s ‘beliefs of a kind  $K$ ’ relevant to access worries for some form of realism about some practice  $P$  (e.g., of talking about mathematics or morals) to be the beliefs which *these realists* take to be expressed by ordinary utterances within that practice.

<sup>27</sup>Here, as usual, **sensitivity** means that if the content of some of our  $K$  beliefs had been false we wouldn’t have still had these beliefs. In possible worlds terms: for every  $K$  belief, the closest possible worlds where that belief is false is one in which (our counterparts) don’t hold that belief. And the **safety** requirement is also cashed out in a largely familiar way, as a claim that we couldn’t have easily formed false  $K$  beliefs, or (sometimes) that we couldn’t have easily formed false  $K$  beliefs “by using the [same] method we used to form our actual  $K$  [beliefs]” In possible world terms, all worlds in a certain sphere of close possible worlds where we continue to use the same  $K$ -belief forming ‘method’ are ones where we continue to have true  $K$  beliefs.

3. Mathematical and moral realists can give a trivial explanation (from broader facts they believe) for both the safety and sensitivity of the relevant  $K$  beliefs.

Justin Clarke-Doane supports this claim by describing a pair of strategies for providing such explanations. I won't say more about his strategy for explaining sensitivity because I grant that it works. But I will discuss (and raise some problems for) his strategy for explaining safety below.

4. If realists can explain the safety and sensitivity of our  $K$  beliefs (from broader facts the realist believes), then access worries cannot give us reason to doubt the safety and sensitivity of these beliefs.

Thus, Clarke-Doane concludes, there can be no legitimate access worry for mathematical or moral realism. However, I will argue that the considerations above give us strong reason for denying 4. There are also some reasons to doubt the safety claim in point 3.

## 5.1 Not All Mathematical Realists can Trivially Explain Safety

Let's begin with my qualms about premise 3. I'll argue that not all mathematical realists can give the trivial explanation for safety that Clarke-Doane proposes. Thus, (even if the rest of Clarke-Doane's argument worked) it would be overclaiming to say that it shows there is no access problem for mathematical realists in general.

Specifically Clarke-Doane argues that mathematical realists have no problem explaining safety because they can say something like the following (along the lines of TRIV above). We could not have easily been wrong about mathematics, because mathematical truths are all necessary and we could not have easily had

‘different’ mathematical beliefs. Thus, all close possible worlds where we have the same mathematical beliefs will also qualify as ones where we continue to have true mathematical beliefs<sup>28</sup>.

As stated, I think this argument needs a little more careful explication. There is obviously a sense in which we *could* have easily had different mathematical beliefs. Clearly if different mathematicians had died in duels or different problems had attracted their interest, this could have easily lead to different areas of mathematics being researched and different approaches being tried. So surely the collection of theorems provable in ZFC which mathematicians accept *could* easily have been different. But presumably that is not the kind of minor difference which Clarke-Doane has in mind.

We can more charitably interpret him as saying that there is some property which our current mathematical beliefs have (say, being derivable from ZFC) such that both: all beliefs with this property are necessarily true and we could not have easily come to form beliefs without this property.

However, even once we have made this distinction, it remains overclaiming to say that Clarke-Doane’s sensitivity explanation can be used to defend mathematical realism in general. The iterative hierarchy conception of sets was developed by looking for *some* coherent structure which lets one avoid Russell’s paradox, not by considering all choices of fundamentalia that would do the requisite work and picking the best one. This suggests that, had history gone dif-

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<sup>28</sup>Clarke Doane writes, “For typical contingent truths  $K$ , our  $K$ -beliefs can fail to be safe in two ways (assuming their actual truth). They can fail to be safe, first, if it could have easily happened that the  $K$ -truths were different while our  $K$ -beliefs failed to be correspondingly different. They can also fail to be safe, second, if it could have easily happened that our  $K$ -beliefs were different while the  $K$ -truths failed to be correspondingly different.

But if the mathematical truths are the same in all nearby worlds, and we are granted the (actual) truth of our mathematical beliefs, then our mathematical beliefs may well be safe even if standard mathematical realism is true. Again, if the mathematical truths could not have easily been different then our mathematical beliefs cannot fail to be safe in the first way (assuming their actual truth). Moreover, if we could not have easily had different mathematical beliefs (regardless of whether such beliefs would have been true), then they cannot fail to be safe in the second way (again, assuming their actual truth). But there are reasons to think that we could not have easily had different mathematical beliefs.”

ferently, we might well have accepted different mathematical foundations, e.g., category theory (or perhaps even something like Quine’s New Foundations [17]) instead of ZFC. However, certain straightforward forms of Platonism hold that a different choice in mathematical foundations would have made our claims factually inaccurate<sup>29</sup>. Thus, it appears that, according to certain forms of realism, we *could* have easily had false mathematical beliefs<sup>30</sup>.

## 5.2 Not All Explanations For Safety-and-Sensitivity Suffice to Assuage Access Worries

Now let’s turn to the larger issue, my disagreement with Clarke-Doane’s claim (in premise 4 above) that access worries cannot call into doubt the safety or sensitivity of the realist’s beliefs, if the realist can explain the safety and sensitivity of her beliefs from other premises she accepts<sup>31</sup>.

The mere fact that a web of belief contains elements that imply/explain the safety and sensitivity of some faculty/belief forming mechanism, doesn’t prevent this web of beliefs from having other features which call this safety and sensitivity into doubt. For example, I might have a great story (involving optics

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<sup>29</sup>Some interpretations of realism, like plenitudinous platonism, quantifier variance and modal structuralism, regard different choices in fundamentalia as equally good, but Clarke-Doane isn’t only committed to defending them.

<sup>30</sup>Later in the paper Clarke-Doane slightly complicates the simple argument I attribute to him above, suggesting that (even if our mathematical beliefs could have easily been different) they are abductively tied to proto-mathematical beliefs which are fixed by evolution and innate. Specifically, he writes: “Our ‘core’ mathematical beliefs might be thought to be evolutionarily inevitable. Given that our mathematical theories best systematize those beliefs, there is a ‘bootstrapping’ argument for the safety of our belief in those theories. Our ‘core’ mathematical beliefs are safe; our mathematical theories ‘abductively follow’ from those; our abductive practices are ‘safe’ ... so, our belief in our mathematical theories is safe.”[4] But adding this refinement doesn’t help address my objection.

For the above point about alternate ways that early 20th century mathematics could apparently have gone still suggests that, to whatever extent our mathematical practices are evolutionarily inevitable, it is not enough to determine the particular choice of fundamentalia (e.g., to force the choice of ZFC rather than category theory, as in the case above).

<sup>31</sup>Of course, an explanation of safety from *generally accepted premises* would block any access worries, as safety implies truth. But, as access worries undermine our belief in the premises the realist uses to justify safety, Clarke-Doane’s trivial explanation of safety doesn’t qualify as an explanation of this kind.

brain, processing etc.) about how using my eyes and memory provided me with many safe and sensitive beliefs about Jane's office, so this aspect of my total picture of myself may look great. But if you point out to me that my other beliefs imply that the air in Jane's room contains a hallucination inducing drug which would interfere with my belief forming mechanisms, this will give me reason to doubt both the truth of my beliefs about Jane's room and their safety and sensitivity. My ability to provide a (so to speak) 'locally' internally coherent explanation for how my beliefs about Jane's room are safe and sensitive, doesn't mean that I shouldn't doubt this safety and sensitivity because (among other things) it doesn't imply that that my total web of beliefs is free of tensions.

I think something similar is going on with the realist who explains her moral reliability via EV-MOR or her mathematical reliability via TRIV. The premises which the realist believes and uses in EV-MOR or TRIV provide a good explanation our reliability about realist morals/mathematics, if they are true. But this fact alone doesn't guarantee that the realist is justified in believing these premises, or that other elements within her total web of beliefs can't give her reason to doubt them. And, in fact, I think other elements in her web of beliefs (her norms that we should, not only, avoid logical contradiction between our beliefs but also minimize our commitment to positing certain kinds of coincidence) do give her reason to doubt these premises.

However, I admit that merely considering the above kind of intuitive counterexample to premise 4 above probably wouldn't move Clarke-Doane. For he explicitly discusses explanations like EV-MOR, and is well aware that his position (that such trivial-seeming explanations can block access worries) looks somewhat counterintuitive. He even notes that the assumptions about the evolutionary robustness of moral beliefs he uses to trivially explain safety (from a moral realist point of view) and thus *block* access worries are the same ones

which Sharon Street uses to *press* access worries for moral realism[4].

This leaves us a *prima facie* puzzle of why Clarke-Doane accepts claim 4. I take Justin Clarke-Doane to resist the intuitive pull of TRIV resistant access worries on the grounds that various attempts at explaining *how* access worries give us reason to doubt realism collapse<sup>32</sup>. Specifically, they either face the Scylla of merely demanding an explanation for accuracy/safety/security from some premises which the realist believes (and hence allowing for responses like those above), or the Charybdis of making justificatory demands so strong that applying them consistently would equally appear to rule out many kinds of uncontroversial knowledge (like the demand that one justify all your beliefs on the basis of indubitable principles).

Understanding Field's access worries as an application of general norms of *ceteris paribus* coincidence avoidance (as I have argued we should) lets us answer this challenge. By formulating the access worry as a demand for internal coherence, we avoid identifying access worries with unacceptably strong demands for explanations of safety and reliability from indubitable premises. But, by cashing out this apparent failure of internal coherence as a holistic tension within the realists' overall web of beliefs (including their norms of coincidence avoidance), rather than an inability to internally explain *any one thing*, we also avoid letting trivializing explanations (like the ones Clarke-Doane proposes) block access worries.

Alternately one can read Clarke-Doane as arguing (from philosophers' failure to 'cash out' the coincidence avoidance intuitions behind access worries in other, less controversial, terms) that our coincidence avoidance intuitions be-

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<sup>32</sup>Although Clarke-Doane represents access worries as presenting new evidence, I think they are – like mathematical arguments – making an *a priori* philosophical point (hence presenting facts which they think an ideal Bayesian agent would already have recognized rather than presenting new evidence on which such an agent would update). This distinction may, in part, explain the different conclusions we reach about explanations like TRIV and EV-MOR.

come unreliable when regularities involving necessary truths are at issue<sup>33</sup>.

However, Clarke-Doane doesn't present much reason for thinking that analyzing the notion of coincidence avoidance in cases where both sides of the relevant coincidence are contingent truths is much easier. Attempts to analyze paradigmatic contingent cases of crying out for explanation in terms of equally questionable notions like that of extraordinary types[18]. In contrast, there are plenty of good paradigms for how to think about coincidence avoidance that would allow it to apply to both necessary and contingent regularities, e.g., in terms of preferring theories that have fewer degrees of freedom and a general scientific desideratum to prefer theories that unify [10].

And, even more importantly, saying that our intuitions about coincidence avoidance become incoherent when applied to necessary truths seems to conflict with existing mathematical methodology, which does seem to use explanation-seeking and coincidence avoidance to guide research[1][12]. For example, the history of John Conway's 'Monstrous Moonshine' conjecture provides a particularly dramatic illustration of how noting a striking relationship<sup>34</sup> between two pure mathematical facts and expecting a deeper unified explanation can lead to important discoveries *even when a proof of both facts already exists*.

Similarly, in philosophy we seem happy to accept that avoiding coincidence in the sense of favoring theories that unify many explanations with few resources<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup>Note that our reliability about mathematics (or morals) is itself not a necessary truth, but rather a match between contingent truths and necessary truths that seems to cry out for explanation, much as it would if an apparently fair series of coinflips spelled out the binary expansion of  $\pi$  to a thousand places. So even if our intuitions about coincidences about necessary truths are unreliable it's unclear they would invalidate our intuitions about the coincidences involved in the access problem.

<sup>34</sup>Strangely enough, this function's first important coefficient is 196,884, which McKay instantly recognized as the sum of the monster's first two special dimensions.

Most mathematicians dismissed the finding as a fluke, since there was no reason to expect the monster and the j-function to be even remotely related. However, the connection caught the attention of John Thompson, a Fields medalist now at the University of Florida in Gainesville, who made an additional discovery. The j-function's second coefficient, 21,493,760, is the sum of the first three special dimensions of the monster:  $1 + 196,883 + 21,296,876$ . It seemed as if the j-function was somehow controlling the structure of the elusive monster group." [11]

<sup>35</sup>We think it's a good thing when a theory of justice or supererogation unifies and explains

Clarke-Doane hasn't shown that there's any *principled and theoretically attractive line* which carves off the specific intuitions about coincidence avoidance and necessary truths which he wants us to be suspicious of (those driving access worries) from general methods of reasoning which are attractive and ubiquitous in philosophy and mathematics. Therefore, absent a stronger argument that such reasoning leads us astray, I don't see any reason to eschew its use.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper I have proposed way of understanding intuitive access worries, which lets us avoid the problems of trivializing answers and over-demanding philosophical presuppositions which beset currently popular approaches formulations of access worries. Specifically, I have suggested that we should think of access worries as invoking a general, shared, norm of a priori theory choice, which counsels us to avoid positing inexplicable coincidences (*ceterus paribus*). This formulation relates access worries to more general norms of 'coincidence reduction' and scientific theory choice.

While this approach reflects familiar intuitions about the access problem, my analysis makes important advances in fending off quietist arguments against the existence of a coherently formulable, non-skeptical access worry.

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a lot of things using only a few resources, and this concern with providing elegant explanation seems continuous with avoiding apparent coincidences. We think it's a puzzle that psychophysical laws and biology line up with (apparent) facts about what responses to pleasure/pain qualia are rational/appropriate, so that the physical basis of pleasant qualia cause seeking behavior and pain qualia cause avoidance behavior, rather than vice versa – and a real advantage of attitudinal hedonic theories (on which painful experiences are just ones that are avoided for their own sake) that they can offer an explanation for this.

## A Explanationist Constraints on Knowledge

Another possible strategy for diagnosing what goes wrong with explanations like EV-MOR (arguably employed by Sharon Street [19]) is that, although they do explain the connection between human psychology and moral/mathematical facts, they fail to address access worries because they suggest that the truth of moral/mathematical propositions (as the realist understands them) plays no role in explaining why we are inclined to accept it.

To motivate this idea, consider the explanation EV-MOR given above. In this scenario, game-theoretic considerations explain why intelligence is unlikely to arise except in combination with a certain proclivity for nepotism. But the fact that these beliefs about permissible favoritism are *true* seems to play worryingly little role in the best explanation for why *we have them*.

We might try advocating an explanationist constraint on knowledge or justification along the following lines **Exp K**: “If S knows that P, then P must figure in the best explanation of S’s belief that P”, and use this to explicate a form of access worries as follows.

Realists about a certain domain face an access problem insofar as they take us to have knowledge of this domain but realist facts (i.e., the kind of facts the realist takes to provide the content for beliefs about this domain) do not figure in the best explanation of beliefs about this domain. Thus, the fact that our best scientific explanations for our moral beliefs do not mention realist facts can be thought of as ‘debunking’ moral realism. And moral realists face a problem if realist facts about morality don’t play a role in the best explanation for our possession of moral beliefs.

Can we use this idea to explicate intuitive access worries? We can try. But I think this strategy is less promising than the coincidence-reduction approach I’ve defended in this paper, because Exp K is deeply controversial and often

rejected by people who feel strong intuitive access worries.

For, note that standard objections to explanationist accounts of knowledge provide reasons (quite aside from realists' desire to dodge access worries) for thinking Exp K is too strong, e.g., that it doesn't seem to leave room for knowledge by stipulation or knowledge of the future. It's just not clear that the best explanation for my belief that James would be on time to class today involves the fact that he was on time to class today, rather than the fact that he was on time to class *in the past*, or some general principle implying that he tends to be on time. Or consider a case where I gain knowledge of a fact like 'all bachelors are men' by making a stipulative definition of the term "bachelor". Presumably, I can have knowledge as a result. Yet there's no obvious sense in which *the fact* that all bachelors are men would explain *my belief* that all bachelors are men. Thus I take there to be (prima face) independent reason to doubt the truth of Exp K.

While those who favor explanationist constraints on knowledge have attempted several (all controversial) rebuttals to these kinds of criticisms<sup>36</sup>, we are still left with a version of the difficulty faced by Benacerraf's original formulation of the access problem: we can articulate a concern for realism only by assuming a very contentious principle (e.g., a causal or explanationist constraint on knowledge). Unless we believe that the many people who feel a strong intuitive access worry are unknowingly relying on such a principle (despite being disposed to explicitly doubt or reject it), this seems like a poor analysis of the access problem.

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<sup>36</sup>Carrie Jenkins articulates a more sophisticated version of Explanationism, which gets around the problems above by appealing to a special explanatory context, rather than the best explanation. But she says very little about what this context is, so invoking it doesn't shed much light on access worries[9].

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